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In the last decades, developmental origins of health and disease (DOHaD) has emerged as a central frame-
work for studying early-life effects, that is, the impact of fetal and early postnatal experience on adult func-
tioning. Apace with empirical progress, theoreticians have built mathematical models that provide novel
insights for DOHaD. This article focuses on three of these insights, which show the power of environmental
noise (i.e., imperfect indicators of current and future conditions) in shaping development. Such noise can pro-
duce: (a) detrimental outcomes even in ontogenetically stable environments, (b) individual differences in sensi-
tive periods, and (c) early-life effects tailored to predicted future somatic states. We argue that these insights
extend DOHaD and offer new research directions.
The developmental origins of health and disease
(DOHaD) framework is having interdisciplinary
impact, inspiring research in diverse fields, such as
medical and clinical science, developmental psy-
chobiology, and public health. One influential
hypothesis within DOHaD states that fetal and
early postnatal experience prepare individuals for
the environment they are likely to encounter in
adulthood (Bateson, 2001; Bateson et al., 2004;
Gluckman & Hanson, 2010; Gluckman, Hanson, &
Spencer, 2005). Such predictive adaptive responses
(PARs) are thought to be adaptive if early and
adult environmental conditions match (e.g., intrau-
terine undernutrition reliably predicts famine in
adulthood). If, however, conditions change during
the lifetime, individuals might develop phenotypes
that do not match their adult environment to
some degree (developmental mismatch), which can
produce detrimental outcomes, including impaired
physical and mental health. We refer to this idea as
the PAR-mismatch hypothesis. Although scholars
who promote adaptive hypotheses in the DOHaD
literature view phenotype–environment mismatch
as one of several reasons why evolved mechanisms
of plasticity may produce maladaptive outcomes
(Conradt et al., in press; Hanson & Gluckman,
2014; Kuzawa & Quinn, 2009), it is a reason that is
often given considerable explanatory prominence.
The best-known application of the PAR-mis-
match hypothesis is the idea that intrauterine star-
vation prompts the development of altered insulin
function and glucose metabolism (Barker, 1994).
These changes can lead to diabetes and hyperten-
sion, and so are often seen as pathological. How-
ever, according to the PAR hypothesis, the negative
effects are due not to the early conditions per se
but the mismatch between the early conditions and
the later environment (in which, in affluent soci-
eties, resources are usually plentiful). The metabolic
changes would actually be beneficial if individuals
went on to experience chronic or temporary starva-
tion in adulthood (Bateson, 2001; Bateson et al.,
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2004; Gluckman & Hanson, 2010; Gluckman et al.,
2005). Consistent with this view are studies show-
ing that the harmful effects of early starvation are
in some cases attenuated or even absent if, match-
ing early-life conditions, the adult environment con-
tinues to be lacking in resources (e.g., Stanner &
Yudkin, 2001).
Another well-known application is the stress
inoculation hypothesis (Garmezy, 1991), which actu-
ally preceded the PAR-mismatch hypothesis in the
DOHaD literature. This hypothesis proposes that
exposure to mild stressors early in life prepares
individuals to cope better with stressors later in life,
and so these individuals have better outcomes than
unprepared individuals, who are mismatched (Rut-
ter, 1993). Consistent with this hypothesis are stud-
ies suggesting that adolescent rats exposed to social
defeat are better able to cope with an aggressive
male as adults than nonstressed controls (Buwalda,
Stubbendorff, Zickert, & Koolhaas, 2013; for a
review of related results in mice, see Macrı, Zoratto,
& Laviola, 2011). Similarly, squirrel monkeys who
experienced brief separations from their mothers as
infants were better able to cope with separations
later in life than controls (Lyons, Parker, Katz, &
Schatzberg, 2009). A recent study in humans sug-
gests that immigrant children born to expatriates
are less likely to develop affective, personality, and
substance-use disorders than other immigrant
groups (Cantor-Graae & Pedersen, 2013; Nederhof,
2013). A caveat is that studies of stress inoculation
typically define “better coping” in terms of health
and well-being, rather than fitness, the true cur-
rency of natural selection (Belsky, 2008; Ellis et al.,
2012; Frankenhuis & Del Giudice, 2012).
Mismatch between early and later environmental
conditions has also been implicated in the develop-
ment of cognitive and socioemotional abilities in
children and adolescents (Frankenhuis & Del Giu-
dice, 2012; Glover, 2011; Glynn & Sandman, 2011;
Nederhof & Schmidt, 2012). There are few studies,
but initial findings are remarkable. In a recent arti-
cle titled Prescient Human Fetuses Thrive, Sandman,
Davis, and Glynn (2012) report that infants who
experience congruent levels of maternal depression
before and after birth (high or low levels) show
superior motor and mental development in their
first year compared to infants who experience
incongruent levels of maternal depression (low pre-
natal and high postnatal levels or vice versa). These
authors argue that already inside the womb, infants
start tailoring their brains and bodies to future con-
ditions and benefit if their prenatal and postnatal
environment match, even if both are stressful (for
related research on nonhuman animals, see Hom-
berg, 2012; Schmidt, 2011). In short, some findings
on metabolism and cognitive and socioemotional
outcomes support what Gluckman and Hanson
(2010) have described, perhaps prematurely, as “the
emerging consensus”: harmful effects reflect “the
maladaptive consequences of developmental plas-
ticity, arising from discordance between the trigger-
ing and later environments” (p. 21).
The goal of this paper is to extend and challenge
this emerging consensus based on three insights
provided by recent mathematical modeling. All
three of these insights demonstrate the power of en-
vironmental noise (i.e., imperfect indicators of current
and future conditions) in shaping development. The
models we discuss explore two sources of environ-
mental noise. First, organisms do not have direct
access to the statistics (or states) of their environ-
ments (e.g., the level of danger). Rather, they may
estimate (or “infer”; no conscious process implied)
these states based on cues, that is, observations that
are more likely to occur in certain states of the
world than in others. Second, the current state of
the world is probabilistically correlated with future
states of the world. So, even if our estimate of
today is correct and precise, we can only make
informed guesses about tomorrow, as in weather
forecasting. Evolutionary models of development
tend to ignore perceptual noise; they assume that
individuals make accurate observations (e.g., detect-
ing an angry face). Instead, they focus on the chal-
lenges of using these observations to infer the
present state of the environment (e.g., the current
level of danger) and predict future environmental
states (e.g., future levels of danger).
All models are by design simplified versions of
reality that capture only some essential components
of a process or system (Frankenhuis, Panchanathan,
& Barrett, 2013; Houston & McNamara, 1999; Man-
gel & Clark, 1988). Each model makes particular
assumptions, which may be criticized. The models
we discuss, for instance, assume that natural selec-
tion has perfectly adapted developmental systems
to their environment (this does not imply that every
individual is optimally adapted; see below). This
phenotypic gambit (Grafen, 1984) allows researchers
to ignore matters of genetic and physiological
instantiation (Maynard Smith et al., 1985). The gam-
bit is a methodological stance that provides a start-
ing point for research. If observations contradict
model predictions, we need to refine our model.
Statistician George Box (1976) famously remarked
that all models are wrong, but some are useful.
Simple models can be extremely useful because
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they increase precision, make assumptions clear
and explicit, remove ambiguities from natural lan-
guage, ensure logical consistency in argumentation,
generate novel predictions, and provide a better
understanding of complex interactions that are
impossible to intuit without the help of formaliza-
tions. The utility of any particular model will
depend, of course, on the assumptions it makes
and how well it is constructed and analyzed. All
models are limited. It is key to understand and
acknowledge what a model can tell us and what it
cannot.
Modeling Development
All traits of organisms (phenotypes) result from
development, that is, are the product of a process
that begins with the zygote and proceeds during
the subsequent lifetime. Hence, natural selection
can only modify phenotypes by shaping developmen-
tal systems, that is, the array of factors (e.g., genes)
and processes (e.g., gene regulation) that give rise
to phenotypes (Bjorklund, Ellis, & Rosenberg, 2007;
Dall, McNamara, & Leimar, 2015; Frankenhuis
et al., 2013; Mangel & Ludwig, 1992; McNamara,
Dall, Hammerstein, & Leimar, 2016). Natural selec-
tion favors systems that tend to construct adaptive
phenotypes, which increase fitness. The term fitness
is often used to denote individual survival and
reproduction. However, fitness should actually be
assigned to developmental systems (or strategies,
genotypes), not to individuals, and the appropriate
measure of fitness depends on the environmental
context and species. The distinction between devel-
opmental systems and individuals is crucial
because, as we will see, optimal systems often pro-
duce detrimental outcomes for some individuals
(Frankenhuis & Del Giudice, 2012).
Individuals change over time, depending on
influences internal (e.g., glucose levels) and exter-
nal to the body envelope (e.g., resources in the
environment). Models describe such changes using
state variables, which quantify the current state of
the individual and predict its future state, if only
probabilistically. State variables can represent any
factor of interest. For example, a model of growth
might describe the composition of the body using
variables representing skeletal size, bone density,
muscle mass, fat levels, the types of tissues present
and their degree of differentiation, patterns of gene
methylation, brain wiring, hormone levels, receptor
densities, and so on. Each variable takes on a
specific value, which might change over time. Age
is typically not a state but rather a crude aggregate
measure, because individuals of the same age
might be in different developmental and physio-
logical states.
Developmental models require an initial state,
which depends on the research question. For mod-
els of epigenetics, the initial state could specify
which genes are methylated or hormone levels
inherited from parents; for models of social learn-
ing, an individual’s knowledge before any social
interactions have occurred. State changes occur
throughout the lifetime, but early changes are often
the most important. These may have lifelong
effects. To understand the fitness consequences of
early developmental responses, it is necessary to
take later effects into account. For instance, chronic
activation of stress responses early in life might
increase immediate survival (by protecting against
threat) but may also accelerate telomere attrition
and associated aging, reducing fecundity later in
life (Herborn et al., 2014; Metcalfe & Monaghan,
2001).
Models describe developmental processes by
changes in the values of state variables. Because
development in real organisms is multifactorial
(i.e., it depends on the interactions between many
different factors and processes), and small differ-
ences in these factors and processes can affect out-
comes, development is often modeled as a
stochastic process; that is, the transitions between
states are probabilistic, yet certain outcomes might
be more likely than others. Even if we know an
organism’s current state, we cannot predict its next
state with certainty. Some sources of stochasticity
are internal. If an animal ingests food, it burns
some fraction, stores another, and excretes the
remainder. We can predict patterns (e.g., store
more if winter is coming) but not exact amounts,
because “cellular metabolism is inherently stochas-
tic, and a generic source of phenotypic heterogene-
ity” (Kiviet et al., 2014, p. 376). Other sources are
external. If an animal forages, it might find food,
encounter a mate, contract disease, be predated on,
or be killed by a rival. The probabilities of these
different outcomes depend on the animal’s foraging
behavior (e.g., hunting for large rewards in an
open field or for small rewards in a safer refuge),
which in turn depends on its state (e.g., hunger
level, calories needed to survive the night, migra-
tion, or hibernation). Despite stochastic influences,
state changes are not completely at random. The
probability that a given change in state will occur
(e.g., energy increase) depends on interactions
between the environment (e.g., food availability,
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density of predators) and the developmental sys-
tem (e.g., behavior, metabolic efficiency).
Animals typically attempt to increase their
knowledge about the environment to respond to it
appropriately (Dall et al., 2015; McNamara, Green,
& Olssen, 2006; Stamps & Frankenhuis, 2016; Trim-
mer et al., 2011). In particular, an animal might use
cues, that is, observations that provide information
(i.e. reduce uncertainty) about some relevant
dimension, to improve its estimate of the current
conditions (e.g., chewed-on carcasses indicate the
presence of predators). An animal might also esti-
mate future conditions, forecasting the future over
the timescale of hours (e.g., barometric changes pre-
dict thunderstorms), seasons (e.g., a mild winter
predicts a mild summer), or even generations (e.g.,
current abundance predicts adequate nutrition for
future offspring; Botero, Weissing, Wright, &
Rubenstein, 2015). Cues are often imperfect: They
reduce uncertainty but do not eliminate it. More-
over, individuals are likely to sample different cues,
resulting in estimates that diverge even for individ-
uals in the same environment, which might pro-
duce variation in phenotypes (Fischer, Van Doorn,
Dieckmann, & Taborsky, 2014; Frankenhuis & Pan-
chanathan, 2011; Panchanathan & Frankenhuis,
2016). Animals also use social cues (Taborsky,
2017). A potential mate might show courtship cues,
which probabilistically predict its willingness to
have sex. A rival might show threat signals, which
predict its ability to fight. On both immediate and
developmental timescales, organisms are continu-
ally making consequential decisions under uncer-
tainty in an ever-changing world.
So, what might a model look like? We may be
interested in the question whether it is biologically
adaptive to mature earlier in a high-mortality envi-
ronment (Belsky, Steinberg, & Draper, 1991; Ellis,
2004; Nettle, Frankenhuis, & Rickard, 2013). To
study this question, we can build a model examin-
ing when it is adaptive for developmental systems
to accelerate their rate of maturation based on
early-life experiences versus mature at a fixed rate
(i.e., irrespective of experience). The answer will
depend on the environment. We can, for instance,
imagine an environment that fluctuates between
different states (e.g., safe or dangerous) during the
lifetime of an individual. These states are autocorre-
lated over time; that is, this year’s level of mortality
predicts next year’s level but not perfectly. We may
then use an optimization technique to compute
optimal developmental strategies, which specify the
best decision for every possible state of the devel-
opmental system. This analysis might show that
only if autocorrelation is very high, early-life experi-
ence tends to provide an accurate forecast of adult
conditions; and hence, individuals should use it. By
contrast, if autocorrelation is moderate or low, early-
life experience provides a poor forecast of adult con-
ditions and might actually be misleading. In that case,
developmental systems might do better by maturing
at a fixed rate that is adapted to the average level of
mortality over evolutionary time (Nettle et al., 2013).
This result is theoretically interesting because it con-
tradicts the intuition that as long as there is some auto-
correlation in the environment, it is adaptive to tailor
developmental trajectories based on early-life experi-
ence. Empirically, it highlights the importance of
actually measuring the statistics of environments
(which is rarely done in current research) in order to
assess the plausibility of evolutionary explanations,
such as the PAR-mismatch hypothesis.
Detrimental Outcomes in a Stable Environment
The PAR-mismatch hypothesis regards developmen-
tal mismatch as a key source of departure from opti-
mal health and well-being. Such mismatches result
from changing conditions over the course of onto-
geny (Bateson, 2001; Bateson et al., 2004; Gluckman
& Hanson, 2010; Gluckman et al., 2005). The PAR
hypothesis guides much empirical research on early-
life effects and has been incorporated into several
influential theoretical frameworks in psychology.
Please note that we use the term early-life effects,
rather than developmental programming, in order to
avoid a deterministic connotation. Early-life experi-
ence may have a lasting impact on adult traits, even
if these traits continue to exhibit some degree of plas-
ticity (Takesian & Hensch, 2013).
To illustrate, the theory of biological sensitivity
to context (Boyce & Ellis, 2005; Boyce et al., 1995)
proposes that individuals evolved to tailor their
levels of plasticity to expected future conditions,
with the potential for developmental mismatch to
be a cost of increasing levels of plasticity (Del Giu-
dice & Ellis, 2016; Ellis, Boyce, Belsky, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2011). The bet-hed-
ging hypothesis of differential susceptibility (Belsky,
1997) states that it is adaptive for parents to pro-
duce offspring with varying levels of plasticity,
based on the idea that plastic offspring thrive when
current cues correctly prepare them for future con-
ditions but suffer when current cues provide an
unreliable forecast (e.g., when a child socially learns
outdated knowledge and behavior from its care-
givers), resulting in developmental mismatch;
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hence, the argument goes, parents produce less
plastic offspring as well, who are less affected by
current cues (Belsky & Pluess, 2009; Ellis et al.,
2011; for a model, see Frankenhuis, Panchanathan,
& Belsky, 2016). The adaptive calibration model
(Del Giudice, Ellis, & Shirtcliff, 2011) posits that
early-life experience calibrates the stress response
system and life-history strategies (e.g., the timing of
puberty) to the challenges an individual is likely to
encounter during its lifetime, which is thought to
be adaptive on average but may result in health
costs if later conditions differ substantially from
earlier conditions (e.g., when a child develops in a
dangerous and unpredictable neighborhood or fam-
ily and then moves into a safe and supportive
school, yet continues to use coercive behavioral
strategies that worked well in its initial environ-
ment to accomplish goals, which might result in
peer rejection, which in turn could produce physical
and mental health problems).
We agree that developmental mismatch can result
from changing conditions over ontogeny. However,
even evolutionary developmental psychologists often
overlook that inferring the present state of the world
poses challenges for organisms, just as predicting
future conditions does. The present conditions do not
automatically “get under the skin” or become “biolog-
ically embedded”with perfect accuracy.
State-dependent optimality modeling is a suitable
method that is used in biology to determine adaptive
decisions in a particular environment, when decisions
are interdependent over time, meaning that past deci-
sions affect future options (Houston & McNamara,
1999; Mangel & Clark, 1988; for explanation tailored
to psychologists, see Frankenhuis, Panchanathan, &
Barto, 2018; Frankenhuis et al., 2013). Such modeling
clearly shows that even if an environment is com-
pletely stable within lifetimes, noisy environmental
cues often produce substantial mismatch between
some individuals’ phenotypes and actual conditions
(Frankenhuis & Panchanathan, 2011; Meacham &
Bergstrom, 2016; Panchanathan & Frankenhuis,
2016). Such mismatch even occurs when: (a) indivi-
duals have the opportunity to repeatedly sample
cues, (b) individuals obtain cues at no cost through-
out their entire lifetimes, and (c) there is a cost to
being mismatched. These mismatches do not result
from malfunction; rather, they are produced by a
developmental system responding optimally to noisy
inputs in a context it is evolutionarily adapted to.
To illustrate, an optimal decision rule can produce
excessive anxiety in some individuals in a stable, safe
environment (Meacham & Bergstrom, 2016). Consider
agents that have opportunities that are either
profitable or dangerous. Before pursuing or declining
an opportunity, an agent samples a cue informative
about the level of environmental danger. Next, an
agent chooses to pursue or decline, following the opti-
mal decision rule (which maximizes its expected fit-
ness). If an agent pursues, there is a good or bad
outcome, and an agent gains additional information
about the level of danger. If an agent declines, how-
ever, it does not gain further information (e.g., a rabbit
leaving its burrow in order to forage learns more
about the environment than one that remains in its
burrow). Because cues are stochastic, some individu-
als sample more danger cues than others before mak-
ing decisions. These individuals may set their
sensitivity to threat higher than necessary, becoming
overly anxious. Their anxiety, in turn, leads them to
decline opportunities, preventing them from learning
the environment is actually safe. Accordingly, the
model “predicts that disorders of excess anxiety will
be common but disorders of insufficient anxiety will
be rare” (Bergstrom & Meacham, 2016, p. 216; for
related signal detection models exploring the evolu-
tionary origins of mood disorders, see Bateson, Brilot,
& Nettle, 2011; Nettle & Bateson, 2012; for a model
showing that depression can result from following an
optimal decision rule in a changing environment, see
Trimmer, Higginson, Fawcett, McNamara, & Hous-
ton, 2015).
Mathematical models generally show that devel-
opmental mismatch is more likely to occur when
systems have been exposed to greater environmen-
tal variability over evolutionary time (Dall et al.,
2015; McNamara et al., 2006; Stamps & Franken-
huis, 2016; Trimmer et al., 2011). A system that
has evolved in a variable environment is uncertain
about the conditions early in ontogeny. Models
represent the distribution of environmental states
experienced by a species as a prior probability dis-
tribution (a prior). If a species experienced a nar-
row range of environmental states, the prior is
centered on those states, and the system starts out
with a good estimate, if the current environment is
still within the range in which the system has
evolved. By contrast, if a species experienced a
wider range, the prior is more dispersed, and so it
will be more challenging for the developmental
system to match phenotypes to current conditions.
Note, however, that if an environmental state is
truly novel, meaning it has never occurred before
in a species’ evolutionary history, developing indi-
viduals should assign zero probability to it, irre-
spective of the shape of their priors. Hence, it is
challenging if not impossible to model responses
to completely novel environments within a
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Bayesian framework (for discussion of the applica-
tions and limitations of Bayesian optimality mod-
els, see Bowers & Davis, 2012; Gopnik &
Bonawitz, 2015; Griffiths, Chater, Kemp, Perfors, &
Tenenbaum, 2010; Mangel, 1990; Trimmer, McNa-
mara, Houston, & Marshall, 2012).
Mismatch is also likely when systems only have
access to low-reliability cues, as these cues help lit-
tle in discriminating between different environmen-
tal states (Dall et al., 2015; McNamara et al., 2006;
Stamps & Frankenhuis, 2016; Trimmer et al., 2011).
When cue reliability is very low, organisms might
ignore cues altogether and evolve nonplastic strate-
gies, such as diversified bet hedging, producing
fixed offspring of different types, guaranteeing that
some fraction of them will match the current envi-
ronmental state (Donaldson-Matasci, Lachmann, &
Bergstrom, 2008; Frankenhuis et al., 2016; Leimar,
Hammerstein, & Van Dooren, 2006; McNamara
et al., 2016). Such bet hedging illustrates a point we
made earlier: Fitness should be assigned to strate-
gies not to individuals. Natural selection might
result in strategies that produce detrimental out-
comes for some individuals.
Even systems that do have access to moderate-
reliability cues, however, might produce some indi-
viduals that are substantially mismatched. Such
mismatch is likely to occur when it is adaptive to
commit to a developmental trajectory early in life,
even if doing so implies having had few opportuni-
ties to learn about the environmental state, thus
increasing the risk of mismatch. Committing early
might be favored, for example, when it takes time
to build conditional adaptations (e.g., predator
defenses) that yield high fitness in specialized form,
if they are well matched (Frankenhuis & Pan-
chanathan, 2011; Panchanathan & Frankenhuis,
2016). A general lesson is that natural selection
maximizes the fitness of developmental systems
(not of individuals), and these systems are likely to
produce some mismatched individuals, even when
these systems function optimally in a context they
are evolutionarily adapted to.
Variation in Plasticity Between and Within
Individuals
Why do some adopted children adapt swiftly to
their new environment, but others remain burdened
by their difficult past? Why do different mental sys-
tems within these children adapt at different rates
to new conditions (Zeanah, Gunnar, McCall, Krepp-
ner, & Fox, 2011)?
Biologists have wondered why all organisms are
not Darwinian demons, that is, why they are
unable to always perfectly match their brains, bod-
ies, and behavior to the current conditions. Of
course, organisms do retain some degree of plastic-
ity in many traits and behaviors throughout their
lifetimes. This degree of plasticity, however, tends
to change (increase or decrease) over the life course,
and individuals differ in their trajectories of change.
The term “sensitive periods” describes periods or
states in which experience shapes a given trait
or behavior to a larger extent than other periods or
states (Fawcett & Frankenhuis, 2015). Importantly,
sensitive periods do not imply “critical periods,” in
which the impact of experience is limited only to a
particular period or state, with irreversible effects
(Takesian & Hensch, 2013). Recent mathematical
modeling shows that optimal developmental sys-
tems may produce species-typical sensitive periods
in development as well as individual differences in
sensitive periods, even in environments that are
stable within lifetimes (Fawcett & Frankenhuis,
2015; Frankenhuis & Fraley, 2017). There are several
reasons for this variation.
Individuals might start out with different priors
because they have inherited different information
from their distant ancestors (e.g., via genes) or from
their immediate ancestors (e.g., via parental effects
or inherited epigenetic factors; Dall et al., 2015;
Hanson & Gluckman, 2014; Jablonka et al., 1995;
Kuzawa, 2005; Lachmann & Jablonka, 1996; Mar-
shall & Uller, 2007; McNamara et al., 2006; Stamps
& Frankenhuis, 2016; Stamps & Krishnan, 2014;
Trimmer et al., 2011; Uller, 2008; Uller, English, &
Pen, 2015). Priors can differ in their means and
variances. Individuals whose ancestors have been
exposed to higher levels of harshness (e.g., war,
famine) might take longer to adjust to beneficial
conditions, as their personal experience is more dis-
crepant with inherited information. Individuals
whose ancestors have been exposed to greater envi-
ronmental variability might adjust more flexibly
when their experience is discrepant with inherited
information, because their priors are more dis-
persed. The extent to which experience (e.g., adver-
sity) affects individuals at some life stage thus
depends partly on their inherited priors.
Individuals might sample cues of different relia-
bilities. The reliability of a cue depends on its likeli-
hood of occurring in different states of the
environment. A cue is more reliable to the extent
that it is differentially likely to occur in different
states of the world, thus allowing for discrimination
between these states (Dall et al., 2015; McNamara
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et al., 2006; Stamps & Frankenhuis, 2016; Trimmer
et al., 2011). For example, a child who observes that
her entire community suffers from death and dis-
ability can draw a stronger inference about environ-
mental conditions (i.e., conditions are harsh) than a
child who occasionally observes a little suffering in
some adults. The reason is that widespread and
severe suffering is unlikely to happen except when
conditions are harsh, whereas some occasional suf-
fering could happen even in beneficial conditions, if
there is a streak of bad luck due to chance (e.g.,
minor injuries happening to different people in the
same village). Children experiencing more reliable
cues might reduce their uncertainty about environ-
mental conditions faster, reducing their plasticity
earlier in life than children experiencing less reliable
cues (Frankenhuis & Panchanathan, 2011; Pan-
chanathan & Frankenhuis, 2016). The “reliability”
of cues (the extent to which the frequency of a cue
varies between different states of the environment)
should be distinguished from their “information
value” (the extent to which they reduce uncertainty;
this depends both on the cue reliability and on cur-
rent knowledge) and their “fitness value” (the
extent to which optimal use of the cue increases fit-
ness; Donaldson-Matasci, Bergstrom, & Lachmann,
2010; McNamara & Dall, 2010; Pike, McNamara, &
Houston, 2016). Moreover, the extent to which
organisms can discriminate between different envi-
ronmental states depends both on the cue reliability
and on the ability of sensory systems to accurately
perceive cues. Discrimination is a product of cue
reliability discounted by perceptual inaccuracy.
Even when classes of cues are reliable and well
perceived, individuals might receive misleading
instances of those cues by chance variation akin to
sampling variation in classical statistics. This will
result in estimates that diverge between individuals
in the same environment, which affect the retention
and decline of plasticity (Frankenhuis & Pan-
chanathan, 2011; Panchanathan & Frankenhuis,
2016). As cues are noisy, some individuals will
have more consistent experiences than others (e.g.,
all safe cues vs. some safe and some danger cues).
Mathematical models show that individuals who
have more consistent experiences reduce their
uncertainty at faster rates, hence they may lose their
plasticity earlier in their lives, even to the point of
irreversibility, that is, critical periods (Fawcett &
Frankenhuis, 2015; Frankenhuis & Fraley, 2017). For
example, when two people live in an affluent
neighborhood in which robberies rarely occur, one
might be victimized twice, the other never. As both
have beneficial experiences as well, the victim
overall has more heterogeneous experiences (some
good and some bad ones). Hence, this individual
might retain more plasticity for longer, adjusting
more easily to harsher conditions if their environ-
ment changes.
In addition to the variation in priors, cue reliabil-
ities, and stochasticity in cues, mathematical models
also suggest other factors that should affect the
retention and decline of plasticity over the life
course. These factors include developmental varia-
tion in (a) the availability of cues, (b) the fitness
benefits of information, and (c) the fitness costs of
plasticity (Fawcett & Frankenhuis, 2015). The cru-
cial point for now is that inferring the present state
of the world poses challenges for organisms, just as
predicting future conditions does, and responses to
these challenges may help to explain individual dif-
ferences in early-life effects observed in empirical
studies.
Predicting Future Somatic States
A researcher who documents an early-life effect
might be tempted to infer that the effect evolved in
an environment that was stable within individual
lifetimes; why else would the organism rely on
early experience in setting the adult phenotype?
This inference, however, is not necessarily war-
ranted. Mathematical models show that there are at
least two distinct, but mutually compatible, adap-
tive reasons for the evolution of early-life effects:
external and internal PARs (Nettle et al., 2013; Rick-
ard, Frankenhuis, & Nettle, 2014; Wells, 2012, p.
262, suggests a similar distinction).
The external PAR account proposes that some
early-life effects have evolved in response to factors in
the external environment (e.g., intrauterine under-
nutrition) that forecasted future environmental con-
ditions (e.g., famine in adulthood; Bateson, 2001;
Bateson et al., 2004; Gluckman & Hanson, 2010).
On this view:
the organism presets its physiology in expecta-
tion of that physiology matching its future envi-
ronment. PARs, therefore, are a form of
phenotypic plasticity in which the resulting phe-
notype is not necessarily advantageous in the
environment concurrent with or immediately fol-
lowing the inducing cue, but is likely to be
advantageous in an anticipated future environ-
ment. The cue thus acts as a predictor of the nat-
ure of this environment. (Gluckman et al., 2005,
p. 527)
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The internal PAR account, in contrast, pro-
poses that early-life effects have evolved because
early experience alters future life prospects by
having irreversible effects on future bodily states
(e.g., through limiting growth, increasing oxida-
tive stress, or accelerating telomere attrition; Fig-
ure 1). Such limitation brings about a correlation
between early experience and adult prospects,
irrespective of future environmental conditions
(Nettle et al., 2013; Rickard et al., 2014). Internal
PARs are more than developmental constraints
(Lea, Altmann, Alberts, & Tung, 2015); they are
adaptive responses to such constraints that tailor
individuals to their predicted somatic futures.
Crucially, the internal–external PAR distinction
exists at an ultimate level of explanation (evolu-
tionary history and adaptive value) and not at a
proximate level (developmental and physiological
processes). At a proximate level, all PARs are
mediated by somatic processes, and these pro-
cesses may or may not be similar for different
PARs (for discussion of differential predictions at
a proximate level, see Rickard et al., 2014).
Mathematical models show that external and
internal PARs can both evolve but do so in differ-
ent conditions (Del Giudice, 2014; Nettle et al.,
2013). Natural selection favors external PARs only
when environmental conditions are stable over indi-
viduals’ lifetimes (e.g., if the world is harsh today,
it will likely be harsh next year). Internal PARs do
not require such stability; rather, these require that
individuals’ somatic conditions are stable over their
lifetimes (e.g., if my body was fragile this year, it
will likely be fragile next year; Figure 1). If an envi-
ronment is completely unpredictable, natural selec-
tion does not favor external PARs, but it is likely to
favor internal PARs, if earlier somatic states are cor-
related with later ones. Such somatic autocorrela-
tion exists in many species. For instance, telomeres,
the protective “caps” on the end of chromosomes,
are considered markers of life’s insults (Blackburn,
Epel, & Lin, 2015), in that they are affected by a
variety of exposures to stress and adversity. Telom-
eres shortened in early life tend to remain short for
the rest of life, and telomere length appears to be a
good predictor of future health and longevity in
Phenotype Phenotype
Early Environment Later Environment
External PARs
Phenotype Phenotype
Early Environment Accelerated somatic aging
Internal PARs
Insults
Predict Adaptive Match
Adaptive MatchPredict
Cues
Assumes Environmental Autocorrelation
Assumes Somatic Autocorrelation
(constrains)
Figure 1. The distinction between internal and external predictive adaptive responses (PARs): two distinct, but mutually compatible,
adaptive reasons for the evolution of early-life effects. Whereas external PARs require environmental autocorrelation, internal PARs
depend on somatic autocorrelation. Internal PARs can evolve even when environmental autocorrelation is low; external PARs cannot,
because it is impossible to forecast future environmental states and adapt to them (Nettle et al., 2013; Rickard et al., 2014; see also Del
Giudice, 2014). Internal PARs are more than developmental constraints; they are adaptive responses to such constraints that tailor indi-
viduals to their predicted somatic futures.
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humans (Bakaysa et al., 2007; Kimura et al., 2008;
Njajou et al., 2009). The most compelling cases for
external PARs have been documented in organisms
that are short lived and/or sessile, in which there is
not much scope for the environment to change in
between the receipt of early cues and the environ-
ment of selection, such as certain species of fungi
(Markiewicz-Potoczny & Lydall, 2016), plants (Gal-
loway & Etterson, 2007), and crickets (Storm &
Lima, 2010). Studies in humans, however, suggest
that having a good start in life (a silver spoon)
improves fitness more than matching environmen-
tal conditions early and later in life (e.g., Hayward
& Lummaa, 2013; Hayward, Rickard, & Lummaa,
2013; Wells, 2007). Perhaps this is because humans
are long lived, like the macaques and reindeer, to
which we turn next.
Recent studies suggest the existence of internal
PARs in wild long-lived animals that inhabit ecolo-
gies that might be too unpredictable for external
PARs to evolve. For instance, Assamese macaque
(Macaca assamensis) that inhabit Southeast Asian for-
ests experience highly unpredictable environmental
conditions: The year-to-year predictability of food
abundance and rainfall is very low, so that it is not
possible to use early life cues to predict later envi-
ronmental conditions. Nonetheless, in this species,
offspring whose energy intake is reduced early in
life as a result of their mother’s physiological stress
display accelerated growth, consistent with their
pursuing a fast life-history strategy (Bergh€anel, Heis-
termann, Sch€ulke, & Ostner, 2016). Similarly, living
at high latitudes, Svalbard reindeer (Rangifer taran-
dus platyrhynchus) experience major variation in
resources in the winter due to variation in rain-on-
snow events, which create ice layers on the ground
or in the snow that limit access to vegetation. Female
reindeer that experienced many rain-on-snow events
in utero tend to be relatively light and small during
both the juvenile and adult stages. Despite this
somatic disadvantage, these females attain reproduc-
tive success in the first 6 years of their lives compa-
rable to females of higher somatic quality, who had
better access to vegetation early in ontogeny. Their
rough start in early life manifested only among
females aged 7 years and older, who had lower
annual reproductive success. The females of lower
somatic quality engaged in reproductive events at a
lower body mass than females of higher somatic
quality. This increased investment in reproduction
probably evolved not as a response to predicted
future environmental conditions but rather as a
response anticipating accelerated somatic decline
(Douhard et al., 2016).
Studies of human development show correlations
between early somatic state and later phenotypic
outcomes, even if early somatic state is not corre-
lated with early environmental stress, or after con-
trolling for such stress. For example, British girls
who experienced chronic disease in childhood
develop earlier timing of first reproduction, even if
chronic disease is not correlated with environmental
stress, such as father absence and socioeconomic
status (Waynforth, 2012; see also Brumbach, Figuer-
edo, & Ellis, 2009; Hill, Boehm, & Prokosch, 2016;
Valencia & Cromer, 2000). Similarly, Danish data
show that low birth weight in girls and boys pre-
dicts lower levels of trust in adulthood, even after
controlling for childhood family environment. Low
birth weight predicts small body size and physical
vulnerability later in life, which might increase the
risk of being socially exploited, making vigilance
adaptive (Petersen & Aarøe, 2015). A longitudinal
study in the United States supports both the inter-
nal and external PAR hypotheses. It shows that
even after controlling for internal health, early-life
adversity predicts greater adolescent risk taking,
problematic functioning, and earlier age of menar-
che (for girls); and internal health mediated the
relation between the early environment and adoles-
cent behavior (Hartman, Zhi, Nettle, & Belsky,
2017; see also Chua, Lukaszewski, Grant, & Sng,
2017). This finding highlights the fact that the inter-
nal and external PAR accounts are mutually com-
patible: Individuals might tailor their development
to predicted future environmental states as well as
future somatic states.
Implications for DOHaD
We have argued that environmental noise has the
potential to: (a) produce detrimental outcomes for
some individuals, even for an optimally functioning
system in a stable environment; (b) cause individual
differences in the timing and reversibility of sensi-
tive periods; and (c) favor early-life effects tailored
to predicted future somatic states, instead of or as
well as predicted future environmental states. We
conclude with a brief discussion of the implications
for DOHaD.
The first implication is that it is important to
explicitly incorporate noise in theory development.
That is, models of the evolution of developmental
systems cannot simply assume that individuals
know environmental conditions perfectly or that
every individual experiences the average environ-
ment. Rather, techniques such as stochastic
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dynamic programming are required (Frankenhuis
et al., 2018; Houston & McNamara, 1999; Mangel &
Clark, 1988), which explicitly incorporate the fact
that average properties of environments lead to
probability distributions of experience, with differ-
ent individuals receiving different sequences of
experience as a matter of course.
Second, a general implication of the material
reviewed is that the normal outcome of evolved
developmental systems is a great degree of varia-
tion, both in final phenotype and in the timing of
the phenotype’s development (Holmes & Patrick,
2018). Extensive variation emerges even if the
developmental system is operating normally, if
there is no “pathology” in the strict sense (Cos-
mides & Tooby, 1999; Wakefield, 1992, 1999; for
recent discussion, see Griffiths & Matthewson, 2018;
Matthewson & Griffiths, 2017). DOHaD has also
tended to focus particularly on mismatch between
early developmental and adult conditions as a
source of deleterious phenotypes. However, as we
have argued, a certain fraction of the population
should be expected to show deleterious phenotypes
even when there is no such mismatch. Essentially,
noise requires us to shift focus from the expecta-
tion that individuals will be optimally adapted to
their environment (if there is no pathology or
environmental change). Instead, developmental sys-
tems are the outcome of adaptive evolution, and
systems, through their interactions with noisy envi-
ronments, produce clouds of phenotypic variation
at the individual level (Barrett, 2015). Many of
those individuals survive and reproduce success-
fully (otherwise the system could not persist), but
not all will do so.
Thus, when explaining disease states from an
evolutionary perspective, we cannot, without fur-
ther evidence, make strong inferences that the cause
is mismatch between developmental and adult
environments. More positively, techniques such as
stochastic dynamic programming allow us to build
sophisticated models of developmental systems
from which the consequences of different kinds of
environmental change and developmental input can
be simulated. These predictions are at the level of
phenotypic distributions not individual phenotypes,
and so they have considerable empirical relevance
to the changing population burden of health and
disease. For example, dynamic models predict that
the distribution of body fat stores will be affected
by (imperfect) cues of food scarcity and will under
many conditions contain more individuals with
excess fat than with insufficient fat, because of the
historical strength of selection on avoiding
starvation (Higginson & McNamara, 2016; Higgin-
son, McNamara, & Houston, 2016). This prediction
may help explain why the prevalence of obesity
can be, apparently paradoxically, increased rather
than decreased by food insecurity and restrictive
dieting (see also Nettle, Andrews, & Bateson, 2017).
A third implication is that longitudinal studies
are important because early experience should
strongly affect later development in complex and
path-dependent ways. This premise has always
been a strength of DOHaD. We note, in particular,
the potential relevance of longitudinal studies of
wild-type animals under ecologically realistic condi-
tions. Using inbred model strains under standard-
ized developmental conditions is generally favored
in biomedical science, for reasons of experimental
control, but it may lead to quite unrealistic expecta-
tions about the degree of phenotypic variability that
is the normal outcome of development. Having said
this, even with inbred strains and standardized con-
ditions, a great degree of phenotypic variability is
in fact observed (Freund et al., 2013; Lynch &
Kemp, 2014).
Finally, although adaptive hypotheses about
early-life effects focus on explaining general pheno-
typic tendencies that emerge in the normal range of
environments, formal modeling of these hypotheses
does invite further reflection on the distinction
between statistical rarity and pathology. Given that
the distribution of environmental experiences is
probabilistic, and phenotypic development is affected
by noise, then extreme phenotypic states will occur
with a low frequency in all populations of normally
functioning animals. Thus, discovering a state of an
organ or system that is rare does not necessarily
mean that the system is pathological, in the sense of
lesioned or subject to a large deleterious genetic
mutation. Rather, the individual may just have had
an unlikely sequence of developmental inputs. It
may be at the edge of the normal cloud.
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